The Explosion of the Challenger
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I wrote the following entry in my notebook after returning
to my office. "I sincerely hope that this launch does not
result in a catastrophe. I personally do not agree with some of
the statements made in Joe Kilminster's written summary stating
that SRM-25 is okay to fly."
As it turned out, I didn't agree with any of his statements
after I had a chance to review a copy of the chart. A review of
the chart will produce the following conclusions from anyone
having normal powers of reason. The chart lists nine separate
statements, seven of which are actually reasons against launch,
while one is actually a neutral statement of engineering fact.
The remaining statement concerning a factor of safety of three
on seal erosion is not even applicable to the discussion which
had ensued for over an hour. Therefore, Morton Thiokol senior
management reversed a sound technical decision without any
re-evaluation of the data they had promised when they requested
the caucus.
The next morning I paused outside Arnie Thompson's office
and told him and the manager of applied mechanics, who was my
boss, that I hoped the launch was safe, but I also hoped that
when we inspected the booster joints we would find all the
seals burned almost through the joint, then maybe we could get
someone with authority to stand up and stop the flights until
we fixed the joints.
It was approximately five minutes prior to the launch as I
was walking past the room used to view launches when Bob
Ebeling stepped out to encourage me to enter and watch the
launch. At first I refused, but he finally persuaded me to
watch the launch. The room was filled, so I seated myself on
the floor closest to the screen and leaned against Bob's legs
as he was seated in a chair. The boosters ignited, and as the
vehicle cleared the tower Bob whispered to me that we had just
dodged a bullet. At approximately T+60 seconds Bob told me that
he had just completed a prayer of thanks to the Lord for a
successful launch. Just 13 seconds later we both saw the horror
of destruction as the vehicle exploded. We all sat in stunned
silence for a short time, then I got up and left the room and
went directly to my office, where I remained the rest of the
day. Two of my seal task-team colleages inquired at my office
to see if I was okay, but I was unable to speak to them and
hold back my emotions so I just nodded yes to them and they
left after a short silent stay.
Conclusion
Roger Boisjoly made a number of choices in the months
leading up to the Challenger accident. He
consistently took an ethical course of action, often risking
his job. Nevertheless, he was unable to avert the January 28
launch. In 1988 Roger Boisjoly was given the American
Association for the Advancement of Science Award for Scientific
Freedom and Responsibility for his extensive and well conceived
efforts to avert the shuttle disaster.